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DAVID E. GRAHAM*

Repatriation of Prisoners of War
During Hostilities-A Task
Unsuited for the Private Citizenry

I. Introduction
On September 2, 1972, the Foreign Ministry of North Vietnam issued a
statement announcing the repatriation of three American pilots held captive by
the North Vietnamese. The statement indicated that the pilots would be
released "... . to a U.S. social organization animated with goodwill and a desire

to bring about an early end to the U.S. war in Viet Nam.... ." It was asserted
that this organization would "... . help those released not to be used in activities

against the Vietnamese people and the Government of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam." The release statement also made reference to three earlier prisoner
returns of a comparable nature in 1968 and 1969, each involving three pilots
and an escort group comprised of American citizens who were actively opposed
to the war in Southeast Asia. The message charged that:
In 1969 the U.S. Government compelled the U.S. pilots released in July that year to
put forward distortion [sic] about the humane treatment policy of the government of
the DRV. At complete variance with their previous statements the U.S. Government
had also used those released pilots in war activities against the Vietnamese people and
other peoples of Indochina. It is for this reason that such releases have been
temporarily suspended....
The point was reiterated with reference to this news release as follows:
The government of the DRV draws particular attention of the U.S. government to this:
in the interests of the families of the U.S. pilots captured in North Vietnam stop using
the released pilots to slander the DRV and further the U.S. policy of aggression in
North Vietnam.
The "social organization" to which the three U.S. pilots' were later released
was a collection of individuals known as the Committee of Liaison with Families
* Captain, U.S. Army, JAGD; Associate Professor, International and Comparative Law,
University of Virginia; J.D. University of Texas Law School (1971); M.A. International Affairs,

George Washington University (1968); B. A., Texas A. & M. (1966). Member, Texas Bar
Association, American Bar Association, American Society of International Law, International Bar
Association.
'Air Force Major Edward K. Elias, Navy Lt. JG Norris Alphonzo Charles, and Navy Lt. JG
Markham Gartley.
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of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam. 2 The Committee's representative
escort group was comprised of its two co-chairmen, Cora Weiss and David
Dellinger, the Reverend William Sloan Coffin, Jr., Chaplain of Yale University,
and Professor Richard Falk of Princeton University. Each family of the three
released flyers was invited by Hanoi to send a relative to take part in the return
process. As a result, representatives of two of the pilots' families accompanied
the escort group to Hanoi.
Professor Falk, a member of the Liaison Committee's escort group, has
recently urged that the procedure by which the three American pilots were
returned to the United States creates a precedent with international law
relevance? This assertion is partially based on an analysis of the return process
made within the context of specific articles of the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW).4 Although no attempt is made to
imply a formal application of the Convention's procedural articles of prisoner
repatriation, Professor Falk urges that at least one article' of the GPW does cast
authoritative light ". .. on what the treaty-drafting governments, and
particularly the U.S. Government, regarded as reasonable [emphasis supplied]
in a situation in which no governmental actor was available to' carry out the
humanitarian mandates of the Convention. ' 6 It is his further contention that, at
least in the absence of revision of the GPW, ". . . this release provides guidelines
and experience as to repatriation during hostilities to a belligerent power and
affirms the capacity of a nongovernmental organization of private citizens to
play a direct role in this process." 7
In a well-reasoned response to these contentions set forth by Professor Falk,
Professor Howard Levie has advanced a vastly different interpretation of the
applicable international law." In so doing, however, he has, in his own words,
discussed the relevant legal aspects ". . . independently of the facts alleged and
the arguments advanced in the article by Professor Falk." As a result, his
'The Committee of Liaison was established in January of 1970 as a result of discussions in Hanoi
between American peace activists and a North Nietnamese citizens' group, the Vietnam Committee
of Solidarity with the American people. Committee of Liaison Press Release, April 7, 1970, at 1-2,
New York, New York, An examination of the Committee's letterhead indicates that at the time of
the release of the three U.S. flyers, Committee membership included David Dellinger and Cora
Weiss, Co-chairmen; Mrs. Anne Bennett, Treasurer; and Richard J. Barnett, Rennie Davis,
Madeline Duckles, Prof. Richard Falk, Rev. Richard Fernandez, Norman Fruchter, Maggie Geddes,
Steve Halliwell, Prof. Donald Kalish, Stewart Meacham, Prof. Bea Seitzman, Prof. Franz
Schurmann, Ethel Taylor, Barbara Webster, and Trudi Young.
'Falk, InternationalLaw Aspects of Repatriation of Prisonerof War DuringHostilities, 67 AM.
J. INT'L L 465 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Falk].
6 U.S.T. 3316; T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as GPW].
'1d. at art. 10.
'Falk, supra note 3, at 475-76.
7
d. at 478.
'Levie, InternationalLaw Aspects of Repatriation of Prisoners of War During Hostilities: A
Reply, 67 AM. J. INT'L L 693 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Levie]. Reference will be made to Professor
Levie's Reply to Professor Falk throughout this article.
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analysis has not been totally responsive to some rather innovative and thoughtprovoking legal conclusions and proposals postulated by Professor Falk.
Moreover, Professor Levie appears to exhibit a tendency to speak in terms of the
traditional World War II context and fails to examine the possibility that
prisoner repatriation guidelines applicable to an "all-out armed conflict" may
have little relevance to the latter twentieth century's limited wars of
"self-determination" and "anti-colonialism.' 9
With these thoughts in mind, it will be the purpose of this article to speak to
Professor Falk's contentions on an issue-by-issue basis. In so doing, the author
will demonstrate that no reasonable legal analysis of the GPW accords any
degree of international legitimacy to the return process of the three American
pilots in which Professor Falk participated. Additionally, it will be shown that
a policy argument based on humanitarianism, advanced in support of the
activities of the Committee of Liaison, is unpersuasive in light of the deleterious
effect these activities could have on the GPW. Finally, attention will be focused
on the suggestion that, in the absence of any revision of the present Convention,
the Committee's actions must be viewed as establishing guidelines for similar
PW returns in future conflicts and an affirmation of the capacity of
nongovernmental organizations of private citizens to play a direct role in
repatriation during hostilities."
II. The Return of the American Pilots
On September 16, 1973, the escort group of the Committee of Liaison,
together with the mothers of two of the American pilots to be returned, arrived
in Hanoi. The group gained custody of the three flyers on September 17. The
release of the pilots consisted of a transfer of control from the North
Vietnamese Army to a spokesman of a North Vietnamese citizens' organization,
the Committee of Solidarity. This organization then transferred custody to the
Committee of Liaison.
Between September 17 and 24, the three released pilots, together with their
relatives and the four members of the escort group, were quartered in an Hanoi
hotel. Social activities and visits to heavily bombed areas were organized by the
North Vietnamese Solidarity Committee for the benefit of the pilots, their
'Professor Falk has responded to Professor Levie's article by means of a letter in 68 AM. J. INT'L
L 104 (1974). In so doing, he makes no attempt to deal with the legal problems posed by Professor
Levie. Professor Falk merely sets forth policy arguments as to why private individuals must be
allowed to "fill the law vacuum" which he asserts surrounds the repatriation of PWs. He insists that
governments are not to be entrusted with an exclusive lawmaking role in a public international law
context. In the sense that a "law vacuum" does exist with regard to repatriation of PWs by small
groups of private citizens, Professor Falk is correct. Such citizens have never been regarded by
international law as proper agents for dealing with what is basically a matter of nation state concern.
Thus, no international convention speaks to the involvement of private citizens in PW returns.
"Falk, supra note 3, at 478.
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parents, and members of the Liaison Committee. However, it is reported that
there was no obligation on the part of the pilots or the other Americans to take
part in these activities."
On September 22, members of the escort group sent the following cablegram
to President Nixon from Hanoi:
We are happy to report that Navy Lt. Markham Gartley, Air Force Major Edward
Elias, and Navy Lt. JG Norris Charles have been released to our custody so that we may
escort them home to the United States.
In accordance with the expressed expectations of the North Vietnamese
Government, and in order not to jeopardize the possibility of future releases, we
believe the repatriation of these men should be carried out in the following manner:
(1) The men shall proceed home with us and representatives of their families in
civilian aircraft.
(2) The men, if they wish, shall be granted a 30 day furlough.
(3) The men shall receive a complete medical checkup at the hospital of their
choice, civilian or military.
(4) The men shall do nothing further to promote the American war effort in
Indochina.
We believe that these terms are reasonable and humane and in the best interests of
the remaining pilots and their families. 2
The U.S. Government made no response to this cable, either directly or
indirectly.
On the same day, September 22, the pilots sent a second cablegram to
President Nixon:
In the best interests of all parties concerned we think we should be allowed to return
to New York with the escort delegation and be allowed to spend a few days with our
families, if so desired. 13
This cable also met with no response.
On September 25, the escort group, together with the pilots and their parents,
departed Hanoi by plane and proceeded to Peking. From Peking, the group flew
to Moscow. Upon their arrival in Moscow on September 27, the pilots were met
by several representatives of the United States Embassy, who recommended that
the pilots consider returning to the United States by means of a U.S. Medevac
plane. The pilots declined this offer. On that same morning, the group departed
Moscow and landed at Copenhagen for a stopover and change of planes. Once
again, the pilots were met by U.S. Embassy representatives who suggested the
pilots consider a return to the United States by Medevac. As before, the pilots
declined this offer.
Upon their arrival at Kennedy Airport in New York on the evening of
September 28, the pilots were met by U.S. Government representatives who
boarded the plane and informed them that they would immediately be flown to
the military hospital closest to their area of residence for medical treatment and
"Id. at 466.
'21d. at 467.
"Id. at 467.
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observation. It is reported that this arrangement was acceptable to one of the
returned flyers but that the other two pilots desired to meet with the press,
attend a reception in the airport vicinity planned by the Committee of Liaison,
and visit with their families for several days before reporting for a checkup and
debriefing. These two pilots eventually agreed to report for medical care and
debriefings at that time; although, in the words of Professor Falk, it was not
"... altogether clear whether the [two] pilots were given any orders to this effect
or whether only a more informal kind of insistence was relied upon by
government officials." 14 All three pilots were given medical checkups, debriefed,
and allowed to visit with their families and talk with the public.' s
III. The International Legal Issues
The first legal issue addressed by Professor Falk in the context of the return
process of the American flyers is the applicability of the GPW to such a
situation. In so doing, he notes that, throughout the war, North Vietnam
vehemently denied the applicability of any of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 6
choosing instead to characterize downed American pilots as "war criminals"
under their reservation to Article 85 of the GPW that was included in their
instrument of ratification. I7 The United States did, of course, consistently reject
this invocation of the Article 85 reservation and insisted that North Vietnam
apply this Convention, en toto.18 Moreover, although Professor Falk states that
the U.S. Government merely ". . . by implication ... indicated an acceptance of
corresponding obligations toward enemy personnel,"1 9 the United States did, in
"Id. at 468.
"3The facts surrounding the return of the three American pilots are taken directly from Professor
Falk's summation of them in his article.
"The U.S. and the governments of North and South Vietnam are each party to the four
Conventions concluded under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross at
Geneva on August 12, 1949. These are Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949 [1955], 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S.
No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955], 6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949 [1955], 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949 [19551, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
"Article 85 of the GPW provides that "Prisoners of War prosecuted under the laws of the
Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of
the present Convention." GPW, supra note 4 at Article 85. North Vietnam's reservation to Article
85 is as follows:
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that prisoners of war prosecuted and convicted for
war crimes or for crimes against humanity, in accordance with principles laid down by the
Nuremberg Court of Justice, shall not benefit from the present Convention, as specified in
Article 85.
"Much has been written regarding the applicability of the GPW to U.S. PWs in the Vietnam
War. For 'varying views on this issue, see Note, The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of
Prisonersof War in Vietnam, 80 HARVARD L. REv. 851 (1967); Levie, Maltreatment of Prisoners of
War in Vietnam in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 361 (Falk ed. 1969).
"Falk, supra note 3, at 469.
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fact, take affirmative steps to ensure that its military personnel were made
aware that the 1949 Geneva Conventions controlled and guided their conduct in
the field.2 0
Having raised the question of the applicability of the GPW, Professor Falk
nevertheless proceeds to indicate that the escort group did regard this
Convention as a source of authoritative guidelines ".

.

. to the extent relevant to

1

this type of repatriation." It is his analysis of specific articles of the GPW
within the context of this particular return process that gives rise to the basic
legal issues involved.
Professor Falk initiates his examination of the Convention by pointing out the
difficulty of analogizing PW repatriation under the GPW with the return of the
American pilots. Moreover, he states, without qualification, that the
repatriation of PWs, such as the U.S. pilots, from one belligerent state to
another while hostilities are still in progress, is never spoken to in explicit terms
by the Convention.22 He proceeds to note, however, that perhaps Article 11723 of
the GPW could be deemed relevant to this situation. This conclusion is reached
by a process of reasoning that ends in the determination that since this
particular article stipulates that no person repatriated under Articles 109 and
110 of the GPW may later be employed on active military duty, the same must
certainly hold true for healthy combat personnel returned to a belligerent power
during hostilities.2 4 Thus, Professor Falk argues that this prohibition against
further active military service must apply to personnel such as the three
returned pilots and is squarely in point with the escort group's fourth guideline
contained in the cable to President Nixon of September 22 .2 He concludes his
commentary on this particular aspect of the return process with the statement
that the U.S. Government has apparently accepted the applicability of Article
117 in this type of situation. 6 Aside from this single article, Professor Falk
2
See MACV Dir. 20-4, Inspection and Investigation of War Crimes (25 March 1966, 18 May
1968, 10 July 1970, 2 March 1971, c.1); MACV Dir. 20-5, Prisoners of War-Determination of
Eligibility (15 March 1968); MACV Dir. 27-5, War Crimes and Other Prohibited Acts (2 November
1967); MACV Dir. 190-3, Enemy Prisoners of War (12 February 1968, 23 August 1968, 1 August
1969); MACV Dir. 190-6, ICRC Inspections of Detainee/Prisoner of War Facilities (8 January
1969); MACV Dir. 381-46, Combined Screening of Detainees (27 December 1967).
2
Falk, supra note 3, at 470.
"Id. Part IV of the GPW, which deals with Termination of Captivity, is divided into three
sections:
I. Direct Repatriation and Accommodation in Neutral Countries [art. 109-117].
I. Release and Repatriation of Prisoners of War at the Close of Hostilities [art. 118-1191.
lII. Death of Prisoners of War [art. 120-1211.
Professor Falk contends that it is readily apparent that §1 does not apply because these pilots were
not sick or wounded, nor were they repatriated to a neutral country; that §11 does not apply because
hostilities were continuing; and that §III does not apply because the men were alive. Id.
"Id. art. 117 of the GPW provides that "No repatriated person may be employed on active
military service." GPW, supra note 4, at art. 117.
2
Falk, supra note 3, at 470.
"This fourth guideline is set forth in text accompanying note 12.
"See New York Times, Oct. 11, 1972, at 9.
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contends that the GPW gives very little guidance as to reasonable terms
regarding this repatriation form.
This analysis of Part IV of the GPW in relation to the return of the American
pilots is both incomplete and misleading. By failing to deal with the GPW as a
whole and Part IV of the Convention in particular, Professor Falk is able to set
forth an apparently credible legal and analytical argument. However, a more
thorough examination of the relevant aspects of the Convention serves to
demonstrate the superficiality of his approach. Such an examination gives rise
to several basic, but extremely significant, questions.
First, does Part IV of the GPW explicitly fail to speak to the direct
repatriation of able-bodied prisoners during hostilities? Professor Falk contends
that it is "readily apparent" that Section I, Direct Repatriation and
Accommodation in Neutral Countries [Articles 109-117], would not apply to
prisoners such as the pilots because of the fact that they were not wounded, sick,
or repatriated to a neutral state. 7 It is interesting to note that this argument is
posed in light of, or perhaps disregard for, both the language of the title head of
Section I and that of paragraph two of Article 109. Perhaps it is understandable
as to how the wording of the title heading alone might be misinterpreted;
however, it is difficult to imagine how the same might be true of the text of the
article itself.
Article 109-General Observations
Subject to the provisions of-tle third paragraph of this Article, Parties to the conflict
are bound to send back to their own country, regardless of number or rank, seriously
wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war, after having cared for them until they are
fit to travel, in accordance with the first paragraph of the f'ollowing Article.
Throughout the duration of hostilities, Parties to the conflict shall endeavour, with
with the co-operation of the neutral Powers concerned, to make arrangements for the
accommodation in neutral countries of the sick and wounded prisoners of war referred
to in the second paragraph of the following Article. They may, in addition, conclude
agreements with a view to the direct repatriation or internment in a neutral country of
able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of captivity.
No sick or injured prisoner of war who is eligible for repatriation under the first
paragraph of this Article, may be repatriated against his will during hostilities."
It would seem to be apparent that Article 109 of Section I would apply to PWs
such as the returned pilots. The second sentence of this article states quite
clearly that parties to the conflict may conclude agreements dealing with direct
repatriationor internment in a neutral state of able-bodied prisoners held for a
long period of time. It is evident that the parties are presented with voluntary
alternative choices. Thus, they may indeed enter into agreements calling for
direct repatriation of able-bodied prisoners during hostilities. The validity of
this conclusion is borne out in the language of the most authoritative
commentary on the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
27
Falk, supra note 3, at 470.
2
supra note 4, at art. 109.
IGPW,
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The wording of this paragraph [Paragraph 2 of Article 109] is in an optional form; it
recommends that the belligerent Powers should endeavour to arrange for such
accommodation with the co-operation of the neutral Powers concerned, the eligible
prisoners of war being defined in Article 110, paragraph 2. Furthermore, it makes
provision for the internment in a neutral country of able-bodied prisoners of war who
have undergone a long period of captivity, if they cannot be repatriated
directly. .. 29

Why, then, does Professor Falk insist that the direct repatriation of able-bodied
PWs during combat is not dealt with in explicit terms by the GPW? It is due to
the fact that the Convention does not make such repatriations mandatory, as it
does those of the wounded and sick? If this is the case, the author would
contend that the two forms of repatriation are distinctly different in nature.
Virtually all states in the international community recognize both the
desirability of and rationale behind the repatriation of wounded and sick
personnel.30 However, surely only the most ardent of idealists would hope to win
approval of a Convention provision calling for the mandatory repatriation of
healthy combat personnel. Realism dictates that in instances of full scale armed
conflict, the temptation to utilize these individuals would simply be too great,
Article 117 notwithstanding.3" Thus, voluntary agreements to repatriate
able-bodied prisoners would appear to be the only practical approach toward
this issue.
Perhaps Professor Falk rejects paragraph two of Article 109 as a means of
repatriating able-bodied PWs because it is, in fact, too explicit. A careful
reading of this article leaves no doubt that repatriations of this kind can occur
only if parties to the conflict conclude agreements specifically directed toward
this end. No reference is made to groups of private citizens or "agreements"
based on a unilateral interpretation of implied consensual silence.32 Thus,
regardless of the reasons underlying his rejection of the direct applicability of
Article 109, the fact remains that it does exist as the only recognized and
codified international legal concept applicable to the situation.
Moreover, there is no necessity for Professor Falk to argue, simply by analogy,
that since Article 117 applies to returned wounded and sick personnel, it must
be deemed applicable to repatriated able-bodied prisoners as well. The
commentary pertaining to this particular article explicitly states just this.
"COMMENTARY

ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE

To

THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF

WAR 511 (Pictet ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARY (Pictet)].
"Professor Levie notes, however, that since PW exchanges during hostilities generally turn out to
be more advantageous to one side than the other, states have been hesitant to repatriate even the
wounded and sick during combat. Levie, supra note 8, at 696.
"This would obviously be even more true in instances of internal conflict waged by guerrilla
bands.
"In speaking to the legitimacy of the Committee of Liaison and the validity of its activities,
Professor Falk asserts that by failing to object to the Committee's designation by North Vietnam as
an impartial humanitarian organization, the U.S. Government consented, by its silence and
inaction, to the Committee's appointment. This contention is discussed on pages 847-50, infra.
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However, it also stipulates that the article speaks only to PWs repatriated
pursuant to Articles 109 and 110.
A. Repatriated persons.-The Article covers prisoners of war repatriated by the
Detaining Power pursuant to Articles 109 and 110, that is to say seriously wounded or
seriously sick prisoners of war whom the Detaining Power is required to repatriate
regardless of number or rank (Article 109, paragraph 1), prisoners of war
accommodated in a neutral country and subsequently repatriated followinig--an
agreement between the Powers concerned (Article 110, paragraph 2), and lastly,
able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of captivity and are
repatriated by agreement between the Powers concerned (Article 109, paragraph 2)."
It is evident that the return of the American pilots in September of 1972 did
not occur within the context of Article 109. Thus, there is no sound international
legal basis for declaring that the restrictions of Article 117 are specifically
applicable to these individuals. The fact that the Department of Defense made
a decision not to reassign these pilots to combat duty is certainly no implicit or
tacit indication of the U.S. Government's recognition of the applicability of
Article 117 to this type of return process. It should be noted, however, that not
even Professor Falk has since charged that the government utilized the returned
flyers as instruments of ". . . official or semiofficial pro-war propaganda." 3
Although Professor Falk does not speak to it, there does exist still another
process, within the context of the GPW, by which able-bodied prisoners may be
returned to their state of origin during the conduct of hostilities. This is by
means of parole, spoken to in paragraph two of Article 21.
Prisoners of war may be partially or wholly released on parole or promise, in so far
as is allowed by the laws of the Power on which they depend. Such measures shall be
taken particularly in cases where this may contribute to the improvement of their state
of health. No prisoner of war shall be compelled to accept liberty or parole or
promise.S3

Note must be taken of the fact, however, that even though the possibility of
parole does exist under the Convention, the granting of such is subject to the
laws and regulations of the power on which the prisoners depend. U.S.
Department of Defense regulations specifically declare that a captured
American soldier ". . . will never sign or enter into a parole agreement.1 36 This
clearly stated prohibition against parole is aimed at efforts the enemy might
take to influence and manipulate PWs. It is felt unlikely that captors would
gratuitously grant parole to certain prisoners without expecting to reap some
33

COMMENTARY (Pictet), supra note 29, at 538.
"Professor Falk contends that previously repatriated PWs were used to disseminate official or
semi-official "pro-war" propaganda. Falk, supra note 3, at 470. He apparently is referring to talks
given by these individuals before various groups around the U.S. and to their testimony before
committees of Congress.
"1GPW, supra note 4, at art. 21.
"DOD Directive 1300.7, inclosure 2 at 1; See also, U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of
Land Warfare, 1187a (1956; Article III, Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces, Exec.

Order No. 10,631, Aug. 18, 1955, 3 C.F.R. 266 (Comp. 1954-1958).
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benefit, even if this is only propagandistic in nature. Thus, under the terms of
the article itself, paragraph two of Article 21, does not provide a method by
which able-bodied U.S. PWs may be returned to the United States during
armed hostilities, and it is therefore inapplicable to the topic under discussion. 7
As has been indicated, it is Professor Falk's contention that the GPW gives
very little guidance with regard to reasonable terms of repatriation during
combat. Thus, in his view, the September 22 escort cable detailing the four
guidelines which were to control the return process of the American pilots was
necessary in order to fill this "vacuum." It is important to note, however, that,
as previously shown, agreements calling for repatriation during hostilities are to
be made within the context of Article 109. The voluntary, rather than
mandatory nature of agreements concluded under this article serves as an
explanation as to why the drafters of the Convention felt it impractical to dictate
the terms of these compacts. These are matters to be specifically agreed upon by
parties to the conflict. A certain degree of flexibility in negotiation isdeemed
essential. Accordingly, neither party may unilaterally specify the "guidelines"
for such repatriations.
It is clear that the Committee of Liaison did not fall within the context of
Article 109. It was never a party to the conflict in Indochina and thus lacked the
capacity to negotiate repatriation terms with the United States, much less
dictate them. Only a cursory examination of the escort group's guidelines
reveals that these are terms to which no state would be likely voluntarily to
agree. 38
The remaining legal issues to be spoken to flow out of Professor Falk's
contention that the role of the Committee of Liaison in the return of the
American pilots can be based on a "reasonable, as opposed to a literal,"
interpretation of the applicability of Articles 9 and 10 of the GPW "... . in a
situation in which no governmental actor is available to carry out the
humanitarian mandate of the Convention." 39 The obvious initial response to
such a contention is that the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC),' ° a truly non-governmental actor did consistently make known its
willingness to perform the Convention's humanitarian activities, including the
"H-istorically, there have been three major methods employed by Detaining Powers for the release
and repatriation during the course of hostilities of able-bodied prisoners of war-ransom, exchange,
and parole. For discussion of each of these methods, see Levie, supra note 8, at 693-694.
3
These guidelines are set forth in text accompanying note 12, supra. Professor Levie asserts that
these guidelines displayed either remarkable presumption, remarkable ignorance, or remarkable
naivete. For the reasons he gives for this statement, see Levie, supra note 8, at 703-706.
"Falk, supra note 3, at 476.
4°The International Committee of the Red Cross was founded in 1863 as the International
Committee for Relief of Wounded Soldiers. Its present name was adopted in 1880. Its headquarters
are located in Geneva, and its officers are of Swiss nationality. This organization promoted the
Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949 dealing with a series of matters concerning
victims of war. It will be referred to throughout this article as the ICRC.
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supervision of PW repatriation. The DRV 1 refused all ICRC attempts to act on
behalf of American and North Vietnamese prisoners of war. Nevertheless, a
thorough analysis of Professor Falk's contention of the "guidance" offered by
Articles 9 and 10 necessitates their careful examination. Article 9 of the
Convention provides that:
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian
activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial
humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict
concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners of war and for their relief."2
Article 10 declares:
The High Contracting Parties may at any time agree to entrust to an organization
which offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy the duties incumbent on the
Protecting Powers by virtue of the present Convention.
When prisoners of war do not benefit or cease to benefit or cease to benefit, no
matter for what reason, by the activities of a Protecting Power or of an organization
provided for in the first paragraph above, the Detaining Power shall request a neutral
State, or such an organization, to undertake the functions performed under the
present Convention by a Protecting Power designated by the Parties to a conflict.
If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detaining Power shall request or
shall accept, subject to the provisions of this Article, the offer of the services of a
humanitarian organization, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to
assume the humanitarian functions performed by Protecting Powers under the present
Convention.
Any neutral Power or any organization invited by the Power concerned or offering
itself for these purposes, shall be required to act with a sense of responsibility toward
the Party to the conflict on which persons protected by the present Convention depend,
and shall be required to furnish sufficient assurances that it is in a position to
undertake the appropriate functions and to discharge them impartially.
No derogation from the preceding provisions shall be made by special agreements
between Powers one of which is restricted, even temporarily, in its freedom to
negotiate with the other Power, or its allies by reason of military events, more
particularly where the whole, or a substantial part, of the territory of the said Power is
occupied.
Whenever in the present Convention mention is made of a Protecting Power, such
mention applies to substitute organizations in the sense of the present Article.41
In discussing Articles 9 and 10, even Professor Falk points out that several
problems exist in conferring a formal status on the Committee of Liaison. Each
of these "problems" merits individual attention in the form of responses to four
specific questions posed by Professor Falk:
1. Was the Committee of Liaison designated by the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV) as an impartial organization responsible for the protection of
American prisoners of war?
2. Did the Committee of Liaison qualify as an "impartial" humanitarian
organization?
4

'The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (The North Vietnamese government).
"GPW, supra note 4, at art. 9.
"3Id. at art. 10.
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3. Did the Committee of Liaison require the consent of the U.S. Government
before it could legally serve as the organization empowered to ensure the
protection of American PWs?
4. Did the U.S. Government have the right to prevent this form of return
process from being used to disseminate anti-U.S. propaganda?
First, was the Committee of Liaison designated by the DRV as an impartial
humanitarian organization responsible for the protection of American PWs?
Professor Falk's response is that there was, in fact, no such official or formal
designation. However, he urges that a series of dealings on PW matters between
the Committee and the North Vietnamese government should be viewed as
constituting a formal designation. An examination of the exchange of the
American pilots in Hanoi reveals that the Committee took custody of the flyers
from an organization described as the Committee of Solidarity, apparently a
group of private North Vietnamese citizens. Such an exchange process would
indicate that the DRV deliberately chose not to deal directly with the
Committee. This type of behavior hardly lends support to a claim of official
designation of the Committee by the North Vietnamese government. However,
the question as to whether there was or was not an official designation by the
DRV of the Committee is, to a certain extent, a moot one. Such a determination
would be of importance only if Article 10 allows a Detaining Power to
unilaterally designate an organization to undertake the protection of and
provide relief for only the PWs the Detaining Power has under its control.
Professor Falk chooses to address this issue in response to the third question he
poses.
Did the Committee require the consent of the U.S. Government before it
could legally serve as an impartial organization empowered to ensure the
protection of American PWs?
Professor Falk contends that the language of Articles 9 and 10 is ambiguous
with regard to whether the U.S. had to agree to the "designation" of the
Committee by the DRV. However, he asserts that it is reasonable, in relation to
the normal rules of treaty interpretation, to conclude that Article 10(2) does give
North Vietnam, as the Detaining Power, the right unilaterally to-choose to deal
with the Committee for the purpose of carrying out the mandates of the GPW.
In support of this argument, he looks to hearings before the Foreign Relations
Committee of the U.S. Senate in 1955. In these hearings, the Department of
State submitted a statement designed to clarify certain portions of the Geneva
Conventions, including a reference to the meaning of Article 10. Speaking to
this article, the State Department declared:
Common Article 10 (Article 11 of the Civilian Convention) provides for substitutes for
protecting powers when protected persons for any. reason do not benefit by the
activities of such a power. In such an event, the detaining power is required

unilaterally to undertake the functions performed by a protecting power. If such

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 8, No. 4

844

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

protection cannot be arranged, the detaining power is obligated to request or accept
the offer of the services of a humanitarian organization, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed by
protecting powers."
The Soviet bloc had set forth a reservation to Article 10, stipulating that they
would not accept a designation by the detaining state of a humanitarian
organization ".

.

. unless the consent of the government of the state of which the

protected persons are nationals has been obtained." ' ' The DRV has since made
a similar reservation to Article 10.46 The initial Soviet bloc reservation was
opposed by the State Department at the time it was made. Based on this
opposition, Professor Falk concludes that the United States must now view the
Detaining Power (in this case, North Vietnam) as having the capacity, or even
the duty, to unilaterally designate an impartial humanitarian organization, i.e.,
the Committee of Liaison.4 7
It is, quite frankly, difficult to understand Professor Falk's rather unique
interpretation of the clearly stated provision of Articles 9 and 10. Article 9 could
hardly be less ambiguous with respect to whether the parties to the conflict must
consent to the activities of an impartial and humanitarian organization
undertaking to protect and provide relief for prisoners of war.48 In speaking to
the activities authorized by Article 9, the Commentary stipulates:
All these humanitarian activities are subject to one final condition-the consent of the
Parties to the conflict concerned. This condition is harsh but inevitable. The
belligerent Powers do not have to give a reason for their refusal ....

For example,

when relief consignments are forwarded, it is necessary to obtain the consent not only
of the State to which they are being sent, but also of the State from which they
come...."
Moreover, a careful examination of Professor Falk's rather novel
interpretation of the meaning of Article 10(2) reveals a total lack of legal support
for his contention that the DRV could, in this instance, unilaterally designate an
"impartial humanitarian organization" as a substitute for a protecting power.
With respect to his contention that, due to its opposition of the Soviet bloc
reservation to Article 10(2) in 1955, the United States must now recognize the
right of the DRV, which has made a similar reservation, to unilaterally
designate an impartial humanitarian organization, Professor Levie has made
this response:
Inasmuch as the DRV became a party to the 1949 Convention only on the condition
"Hearings on the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, June 3, 1955, at 62.
,5Id.
461n acceding to the GPW, the DRV made a reservation to Article 10 stating that it would not
"recognize as legal" such a request by the Detaining Power "unless the request has been approved
by the State upon which the prisoners of war depend." 274 U.N.T.S. 339.
4
Falk, supra note 3, at 475.
"See text at note 42, supra.
"COMMENTARY (Pictet), supra note 29, at 109.
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that no neutral state or humanitarian organization could be designated by a Detaining
Power to act as a substitute for the Protecting Power without the consent of the Power
of Origin, it is certainly inverse reasoning to claim that this established the right of the
DRV, acting as a Detaining Power, unilaterally so to designate the Committee of
Liaison, without the consent of the United States, the Power of'Origin10
Moreover, Professor Levie quite accurately points out that Professor Falk,
though mentioning State Department opposition to the Soviet bloc reservation
to Article 10(2), nevertheless fails to speak to the position officially taken by the
United States in connection with the ratification of the 1949 Convention:
Rejecting the reservations which States have made with respect to the Geneva
Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, the United States accepts
treaty relations with all parties to that Convention, except as to the changes proposed
by such reservations. 5I
The normal rules of treaty interpretation upon which Professor Falk states he
bases his conclusions regarding the applicability of Article 10(2) would appear
to refute the idea that the United States must recognize the right of the DRV
unilaterally to appoint an impartial humanitarian organization. s2 These rules
would dictate that while the United States has treaty relations with any state
which has ratified or acceded to the 1949 Convention with a reservation to Article
10, those treaty relations are subject to the changes made by the reservation.
This means that neither the United States nor a reserving State, when acting as
a Detaining Power, may designate a neutral Power or a humanitarian
organization as a substitute for the Protecting Power without the approval of the
Power of Origin.
Perhaps the basic flaw in Professor Falk's analysis of Article 10(2) is his
misinterpretation of the conditions under which the article may be effectuated.
Professor Levie has correctly pointed out that Article 10 deals with the activities
of Protecting Powers and of substitutes for Protecting Powers, rather than with
those of the "impartial humanitarian organization" referred to in Article 9. He
thus finds it inconceivable that a group such as the Committee of Liaison could
possibly qualify as an organization "offering guarantees of impartiality and
efficacy to perform the duties of the Protection Power," the requirements set
forth in 10(1) for an organization that may be designated under 10(2).
Although Professor Levie is correct in his interpretation of Article 10(2), he
has not spoken to perhaps the major oversight of Professor Falk's interpretative
process. The Commentary to the 1949 Convention is most explicit in stipulating
that the organization which may be utilized as a substitute for a Protecting
Power under 10(2) must be agreed upon by the parties to the conflict.
'SLevie, supra note 8, at 708.
"Id.
2
For the normal rules of treaty interpretation regarding the legal effect of reservations, see art.
20-21, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). Although this
Convention has no retroactive effect, it does embody treaty rules generally regarded as customary
international law. See also. PILLOUD,
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The text leaves no freedom of choice with regard to the organization whose services
may be requested. Only one can be meant, if such a one exists. The words "or such an
organization" do not mean any organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality
and efficacy. They can refer only to the organization mentioned in the previous line as
being "provided for in the first paragraph above," that is to say, an organization
appointed by previous agreement between the contracting Parties, and consequently
accepted in advance by the Power of Origin. (Emphasis supplies)53
The Commentary thus appears to refute any contention that a humanitarian
organization may be unilaterally designated as a substitute for a Protecting
Power under Article 10(2).
Perhaps the strongest argument which could have been advanced by
Professor Falk in support of his contention of the legitimacy of unilateral
designation would have centered around Article 10(3), rather than 10(2). Under
this particular paragraph, a humanitarian organization is not expected to fulfill
all the functions incumbent upon a Protecting Power by virtue of the
Convention. Unlike a Protecting Power or its substitute, the organization does
not act as an agent, but merely as a voluntary helper concerned with only
humanitarian functions. Accordingly, the Committee of Liaison, acting under
10(3), would not be subject to the contention of Professor Levie that due to its
failure to meet the requirements of 10(1), the Committee could not be
designated to function under 10(2). Moreover, if action is taken under 10(3), the
Detaining Power is under an affirmative duty to request the intervention of a
humanitarian organization or accept an offer made by such an organization."
It would appear, on the surface, that an Article 10(3) argument regarding the
correctness of the unilateral designation of the Committee of Liaison by the
DRV can be made. However, although it is perhaps a stronger base upon which
to legitimate the activities of the Committee, it, too, fails to meet the
requirements set forth in the Commentary. In discussing Article 10(3), the
Commentary explicitly states that a designation of an organization under 10(3)
is to be a "last resort." This action is to be taken only if the Detaining Power,
although wishing to apply 10(2), has failed to find a neutral state or an
organization spoken of in that paragraph. Not even Professor Falk has
contended that the DRV sought out a neutral state to serve as a substitute for a
Protecting Power. Moreover, although the ICRC stood ready to function in such
a capacity, the DRV refused to accept the services of this organization."5
However, the Commentary would appear to indicate that a Detaining Power
may refuse an affirmative offer of assistance made by a particular humanitarian
organization if it can demonstrate its justification in doing so. In addition, such
53

COMMENTARY

(Pictet), supra note 29, at 119.

"Id. at 119-120.
"Indeed, Professor Falk even speaks of the DRV's attitude of "hostility" toward the ICRC. Falk,
supra note 3, at 476.
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an offer may be rejected if the Detaining Power has sought and received a prior
offer of service by another qualified humanitarian body. 6
In order to demonstrate its compliance with the provisions of 10(3), then, the
DRV must have been able to show that it sought but could not find a neutral
state or organization to serve as a substitute for a Protecting Power, that it was
justified in declining the offer of the ICRC to serve in such a capacity, or that it
had, prior to the ICRC offer, obtained the cooperation of the Committee of
Liaison, a qualified "impartial humanitarian organization." 7 Proof of such
compliance has never been forthcoming. Accordingly, it would appear that
there exists no portion of Article 10 upon which Professor Falk can legally base
the activities of the Committee.
There remains for discussion perhaps the most intriguing argument upon
which Professor Falk bases the legitimacy of the unilateraldesignation of the
Committee. This is the contention that such a designation must be
determinative in the absence of an objection from the country whose men are
detained that the organization is not "impartial" or "humanitarian."5 18 In other
words, Professor Falk argues that the failure of the United States to object to the
unilateral designation of the Committee of Liaison does, in fact, constitute
consent on the part of the American government to this action.
In support of this argument of "consent by silence," Professor Falk points out
that there was never any U.S. Government effort to interfere with or object to
the activities of the Committee. Moreover, he contends that the decision of the
government not to oppose David Dellinger's application for leave to travel with
the escort group when he was free on bail pending an appeal must be viewed as
tangible evidence of an implied consent by the United States to Committee
activities.5 9 On the basis of these facts, Professor Falk contends that the
designation of the Committee as an "impartial humanitarian organization"
was, in fact, "a consensual process." 6 Thus, even though he never specifically
states that the failure of the U.S. Government to prevent the return of the three
American pilots constituted a "legal" acceptance of the Committee as a validly
designated organization, this is certainly the thrust of his reasoning.
Professor Levie has concluded that this particular contention ".

.

. does not

even appear to warrant discussion. ' 61 Notwithstanding this sentiment on the
part of Professor Levie, however, it is apparent that an argument of "implied
(Pictet), supra note 29, at 119-120.
"The commentary which accompanies art. 9 of the GPW sets forth specific requirements which
an "impartial humanitarian organization" must fulfill. These are discussed in text accompanying
notes 68-79, infra.
"Falk, supra note 3, at 475.
"Id. at 474.
"Id. at 477.
"Levie, supra note 8, at 707.
"COMMENTARY
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consent" does exist. In speaking to this contention, it is necessary to address five
specific issues.
Do Articles 9 and 10 of the 1949 Convention require that the "consent" or
"agreement" to which they refer be formalized in written form between the
interested parties? An analysis of the Commentary reveals that no mention is
made of the necessity for written agreement or consent. 62 Moreover, it has long
been an established concept of treaty law that an international agreement need
not be in writing.63 Thus, it would appear that neither the Convention nor
international law required that the U.S. Government give written consent or
agreement to the designation of the Committee by the DRV.
May the national law concepts of consent by silence, i.e., implied consent and
estoppel, be utilized in dealings between states in the international community?
Surely it can be argued that these are general principles of law, common to all
civilized states, and that as such, they constitute a fundamental source of
international jurisprudence recognized and applied by international tribunals.64
Did inaction and silence on the part of the American government constitute
an implied consent to and thus a legitimation of the designation of the
Committee by the DRV? Professor Falk urges that the "failure" of the U.S.
Government to prevent the action taken by the Committee must be viewed as a
consent to its designation. If, in fact, the United States objected to this
designation, why did it not say so? Moreover, it would have been a simple
process for the government simply to prohibit any Committee activity. It
obviously chose to not do so. Furthermore, the government brought no charges
under the Logan Act 6" against the individual members of the Committee
involved in the repatriation procedure. All of this inaction on the part of the
American government would appear to lend credence to Professor Falk's
contention that the release of the American pilots was, in fact, a consensual
process. However, perhaps a realistic examination of the particular time period
in question and overall government policy might prove otherwise.
To anyone familiar with the degree of division generated in the United States
by the Vietnam conflict, the reasoning behind the American government's
decision to take no affirmative action to prevent the return of the three U.S.
pilots in September of 1972 is not difficult to comprehend. It takes very little
imagination to visualize the reaction of the American public to a decision by the
Administration to stand in the way of the return of American PWs. Such a move
2

COMMENTARY

(Pictet), supra note 29, at 103-122.

"3This fact is noted in art. 3 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties. This article
states: "The fact that the present Convention does not apply to international agreements ... not in
written form, shall not affect: (a) the legal force of such agreements. . ." Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969).
"Indeed, art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists "general principles of law
recognized by nations" as a source of international law on which the Court bases its decisions.
6518 U.S.C. 953. The purpose of this legislation is to prevent private U.S. citizens from interjecting
themselves into the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs.
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could have only created further tension and division within the United States.
It is difficult to believe that the Committee of Liaison was not fully aware that
such was the case. Moreover, various other private American citizens, such as
Ross Perot, attempted to arrange for the repatriation of U.S. prisoners of war.
At no time did the government stand in the way of any of these individuals. Nor
did the Justice Department attempt to prosecute these citizens under the Logan
Act. If any or all of these efforts had met with success, could each of -these
groups then lay claim to the fact that the American government had impliedly
consented to its functioning under the GPW as an "impartial humanitarian
organization"? Surely the response to this question must be a negative one.
Thus, it would appeal' that a decision to permit all private efforts to free
American PWs cannot be interpreted as an indication of the fact that the
government viewed each of these groups as officially acting on its behalf.
Indeed, no private organization ever received official government sanction or
approval.
With respect to the Committee of Liaison, the government was most careful to
take no action which might have been interpreted as even tacit governmental
recognition of any official capacity of the Committee. As Professor Falk points
out, the American government never communicated with the Committee's
escort group. 66 In his view ".

.

. it seems ...

unreasonable for the U.S.

Government not to respond either by way of acceptance, reasoned rejection, or
through the proffer of an alternative set of guidelines." 7 Perhaps a bit more
realistic view of such behavior would indicate an awareness on the part of the
government that any contact with the Committee might immediately be taken as
some form of official governmental recognition. This same reasoning
undoubtedly led to the government's desire to have the repatriated pilots return
by military rather than commercial aircraft. Thus, in the final analysis, it
appears that, rather than impliedly consenting to the designation of the Liaison
Committee by the DRV, the U.S. Government consciously avoided taking any
action which could have been interpreted as official consent to Committee
activities.
Having gained the return of three members of its armed services, was the
United States, in effect, estopped from denying the validity of the Committee's
designation or its activities? That is, having derived the benefits (the return of
the flyers) of an "agreement," however implied it might have been, was the U.S.
Government estopped from contending that such an agreement never existed?
Again, it would appear that a response to this question must be in the negative.
What would one have the United States do in this type of situation? Issue a
public statement proclaiming no interest whatsoever in the return of the
"Falk, supra note 3, at 467.

"Id. at 475.
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American pilots? Prevent the return of the PWs altogether? Should the
government actually have been required to take these steps in order to protect
itself from an estoppel argument raised in connection with the contention that
the repatriation was a "consensual process"?
Finally, even if a determination is made that the American government did
impliedly consent to the DRV's designation of the Committee, would such an
"agreement" confer upon the Committee the status of an impartial
humanitarian organization called for in Articles 9 and 10 of the GPW? Suffice it
to say that no type of agreement between the U.S. and the DRV could
automatically confer international legitimacy upon any organization or its
activities. Achievement of such a status comes only when a group meets all
requirements set forth in the Convention. Evidence of the fact that the
Committee failed to meet these requirements can best be set forth in response to
the second of the four questions raised by Professor Falk in his discussion of a
"reasonable interpretation" of Articles 9 and 10.
Does the Committee of Liaison qualify as an "impartial humanitarian
organization?" 68
It is only the ICRC or a similar type of body which might undertake the
humanitarian activities spoken to in Articles 9 and 10 of the GPW. The
Commentary specifically declares that". . . the organization's activities must be
purely humanitarian in character; that is to say they must be concerned with
human beings as such, and must not be affected by any political or military
consideration." 69
In commenting upon the legitimacy of such an organization, Professor Levie
contends it must meet three basic requirements. First, it must be impartial in its
operation; second, it must be humanitarian in concept and function; and third,
it must have some institutional, operational, and functional resemblance to the
ICRC. 7 ° It is upon the basis of these criteria that he questions the authenticity of
the Committee.
The Committee of Liaison was anything but "impartial"; it was more strongly
motivated by political than by humanitarian considerations; and its existence as an
"organization" within the meaning of the 1949 Convention was, at the very least,
debatable.71
It may be somewhat unjust to question the humanitarian motivations of the
Committee, as it would appear that its members were sincerely concerned with
the loss of life and suffering involved in the Vietnam conflict. Moreover, an
attack on the legitimacy of the Committee based on its lack of organization
"Art. 9 and 10 of the GPW speak to this type of organization. For the full text of these articles,
see text accompanying notes 42-43, supra.
*COMMENTARY (Pictet), supra note 29,

at 107-108.

'0 Levie, supra note 8, 698.
"Id. at 702.
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along the lines of the ICRC is perhaps a bit tenuous. However, Professor Levie is
correct in questioning the Committee's impartiality. In so doing, he details the
great publicity which surrounded the release of the three American pilots and
the fact that these PWs, as well as others before them,72 were released to
well-known anti-war individuals.73 Moreover, he sets forth a well-reasoned
concept of what he believes to be true "impartiality" in this type of situation.
An "impartial" organization is one which, as an institution, is unbiased and
unprejudiced, fair and equitable to both sides in its operations, one which neither by
act nor by statement gives any indication that it prefers one side over the other."
M

Finally, Professor Levie contends that although the GPW does not require that
an "impartial" organization be international or neutral, he finds it "almost
inconceivable" that an organization which is based in the territory of one
belligerent would be permitted to function in the territory of an opposing
belligerent, no matter how "impartial" it was reputed to be.7"
While such facts and arguments do evidence a lack of impartiality on the part
of the Committee, it would appear that there exists even stronger proof of the
fact that this organization was committed to certain political positions on the
war and that it actively sought to promote them throughout the United States.
Professor Falk has indicated that even though the Committee of Liaison was
exclusively composed of American citizens who had taken a public position
against the U.S. role in Indochina, it ". . . did not seek to do more in relation to
prisoner issues than to serve its humanitarian purposes and to disseminate its
views on the condition of camps and how to secure the repatriation of other
prisoners." 76 Yet, Committee newsletters sent to the families of American PWs
often contained articles critical of American policy and questioned government
concern for the imprisoned servicemen. Examples of these articles can be found
in the newsletters of 30 October 1970, 21 March 1971, and 8 June 1971." 7 A brief
passage from one is representative of the Committee's "impartial" approach.
Many of you have said you are not political and have no position on the war. Whether
you think of yourself as political or not, that isn't the way life works.... As you may
know, the Amendment to End the War comes up before the Senate for a vote on June
22. If this legislation is passed by the Congress and ratified by the President, setting
the date for total withdrawal of troops and cutting off appropriations for use in and
over Indochina, it would trigger immediate arrangements for release of prisoners.
"Professor Levie identifies these previously released pilots. Levie, supra note 8, at nn. 45-48.
"Levie, supra note 8, at 702-703.
"Id. at 698.
"Id. at 699. Despite the Commentary to the GPW and Professor Levie's interpretation of
"impartiality," Professor Falk continues to insist that the GPW is "vague and ambiguous" with
regard to the qualifications of an impartial humanitarian organization. Falk, note 9, supra.
76
Falk, supra note 3, at 473.
"Newsletters of the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North
Vietnam. The address from which these letters were mailed was listed as 365 West 42nd Street, New
York, N.Y. 10036.
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There are approximately 44 committed votes in the Senate. Many of you ask what can
be done. Certainly public pressure on our elected representatives could push this bill
over the hill."
Surely, public pronouncements such as this fly in the face of the Commentary's
explicit stipulation that an "impartial" humanitarian organization's activities
must not be affected by any political or military consideration. Thus, it would
appear that due to its proven lack of the degree of impartiality demanded of it
by Article 9 of the GPW, the Committee failed to achieve an internationally
legitimate status.
Professor Falk poses one last question in his discussion of the Committee's
legitimacy in terms of Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention.
Did not the U.S. Government have some protection against the use of the
process of repatriation to disseminate hostile propaganda?
That is, why should North Vietnam not be expected to deal with a
"genuinely '" 9 neutral organization? His response is very brief. Instead of
offering some feasible explanation for the DRV's refusal to deal with the ICRC,
he attacks the U.S. Government for its "reliance" on various "pro-war" groups
interested in the PW issue. No effort is made to define what this governmental
"reliance" was. As has been indicated, the American government gave no
official sanction to any group of private citizens working for the return of PWs.
* Admittedly, some element of propaganda is generally associated with every
prisoner exchange. However, the U.S. Government, as well as all other
governments, parties to the GPW, does have the right to expect that it will be
protected from the distribution of enemy propaganda to the fullest extent
possible. This protection can be offered only in the form of the impartial
humanitarian organization spoken to in the convention. Thus, as a signatory to
this international agreement, the DRV is not only "expected" but obligated
under law to deal with such a body. Its rejection of the ICRC, a universally
recognized organization specifically spoken to in the Convention, in favor of a
group of private American citizens sympathetic to its cause, is quite simply, a
violation of its treaty commitments.
Finally, Professor Falk contends that the "impropriety" ' 80 of the DRV's action
(apparently its rejection of the ICRC and its unilateral designation of the
Committee of Liaison) can only be assessed by reference to whether there has
been a "substantial" 8 fulfillment of the humanitarian purposes underlying the
Convention. In other words, he. appears to be saying "As long as some
humanitarian benefit is derived through our efforts (as defined by those of us
"Committee Newsletter of 8 June 1971, at 1-2.
"Professor Falk places this word in quotes in his article.
"This word is used by Professor Falk. Apparently this is an acknowledgment of improper
behavior on the part of the DRV.
"The implication appears to be that there was, in fact, substantial fulfillment of the
humanitarian purposes of the GPW by the Committee.
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involved in the process) let's not worry too much about whether we act in
accordance with the applicable law." Succinctly stated, the end justifies the
means. Hopefully, for the sake of all codified law, domestic as well as
international, such reasoning will never prove to be persuasive.
In the view of Professor Falk, these are the four "problems" with conferring a
formal status on the Committee of Liaison. The arguments he sets forth in
discussing these issues have been responded to in order to demonstrate the
Committee's failure to achieve any degree of legitimacy within the context of the
applicable international law.
IV. The Policy Issues
In concluding his article, Professor Falk deals with what he categorizes as the
underlying policy issue involved in the return process. "How do we interpret the
release and repatriation of three prisoners out of a prisoner population in North
Vietnam of several hundred?" 8 2 In speaking to this question, he initially
contends that there simply exists no satisfactory explanation for the actions of
the DRV. However, he then proceeds to set forth, in the form of a series of
questions, a most persuasive argument that North Vietnam was indeed
motivated by a desire to foster hostile propaganda in connection with the
release: 11
Why else did they [the DRV] release the men into the custody of anti-war leaders?
Why else did they provide tours of the bombed areas and entertainment for the
released men and their relatives?
Why was it insisted [sic] that the released men be returned to the American people
rather than the American government?
Why was a route arranged that was indirect and proceeded as fast as possible by way
of countries opposed to American policy in Vietnam?
Why was the release timed to coincide with a pre-election period in which the
Administration's war and prisoner policy was under attack by the opposition
candidate? "
Professor Falk chooses not to respond to these questions, for the answer to
each appears to confirm the obvious. The DRV saw the Committee as a group of
concerned Americans who could be manipulated into serving as extremely
valuable propaganda agents. The release of the three American pilots in
September of 1972 was simply an effective use of the Committee members as
such. 8 Professor Falk, however, contends that this kind of North Vietnamese
motivation is of no account. He insists that at least some humanitarian benefit
was gained. 86 Again, this appears to be an indication of a reasoning process that
"Falk, supra note, at 477.
"Professor Levie raises similar questions. Levie, supra note 8, at 709.
"Falk, supra note 3, at 478.
"Professor Levie speaks to how each release of a token number of American PWs to anti-war
groups was utilized as a major propaganda device by the DRV. Levie, supra note 8, at 709.
"Falk, supra note 3, at 478.
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is willing to overlook a total violation of the established international concepts of
repatriation in order to achieve the goals of a small group of private U.S.
citizens. This is not to say that all Americans did not share in the joy of having
three American servicemen returned to their families. However, thoughtful
consideration must be given as to whether the manner in which they were
returned promoted the best interests of the hundreds of PWs who remained
behind. Moreover, the activities of the Committee of Liaison give rise to what
appears to be the most fundamental of policy issues. Did the return of the three
pilots by a process which sanctioned the DRV's blatant disregard for the
dictates of the GPW outweigh the damaging effect this type of repatriation
procedure might have on the utility of the Convention in future conflicts? It is
the author's belief that any degree of legitimacy accorded to the activities of the
Committee in the name of humanitarianism would be a significant step toward
vitiating an international convention carefully designed to provide
humanitarian safeguards for all men and women engaged in hostilities, rather
than to only a chosen few.
V. Conclusions
Professor Falk has set forth the proposition that the process by which the
repatriation of the American pilots occurred creates precedence with significant
international law relevance. This contention is partially based on what he
believes to be a reasonable interpretation of the relevant articles of the GPW. It
is possible that such a repatriation procedure may indeed prove to have a
substantial impact on international law. However, its future significance will not
be the result of its proven legitimacy in terms of the current Convention. A
careful analysis of the relevant articles of the GPW has shown that no
reasonable legal interpretation of its terms indicates compliance with its
requirements by either the DRV or the Committee of Liaison. Professor Falk is
simply incorrect when he states that the Convention does not provide for
repatriation of PWs during hostilities. Article 109 provides for this in explicit
terms. This particular article requires, however, that parties to the conflict agree
to the terms of such a repatriation process. As has been demonstrated, this
agreement never occurred. Perhaps aware of the failure to meet this stipulation,
Professor Falk attempts to base the legitimacy of the DRV's unilateral
designation of the Committee as an "impartial humanitarian organization" on
a "reasonable" interpretation of Articles 9 and 10 of the GPW. In responding to
the four "problems" he suggests are inherent in such a designation, it has been
shown that first, there was no formal designation of the Committee by the DRV.
The North Vietnamese government simply utilized the Committee as an
effective element of propaganda. Second, the Committee did not qualify as an
"impartial" organization. Evidence has been offered in proof of the fact that
this group of American citizens actively opposed the efforts of the U.S.
InternationalLawyer, VoL 8, No. 4
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Government in Vietnam. Third, the activities of the Committee were never
consented to by the United States. A decision to allow various groups of private
citizens to attempt to arrange a return of PWs cannot be interpreted as an
official governmental sanction of the activities of any one body. Moreover, even
if such inaction on the part of the U.S. Government is viewed as some form of
consent to the activities of the Committee, this consent does not legitimate the
Committee or its actions in terms of the GPW. Fourth, the American
government, as well as all other governments, does have some form of protection
against the use of PW repatriation as a means by which to distribute hostile
propaganda. This is the GPW requirement that PW returns which occur within
the context of Articles 9 and 10 of that Convention be conducted through a truly
impartial humanitarian organization agreed upon by the parties. Thus, the fact
that a state has ignored the requirements of an international agreement
designed to safeguard the rights of all PWs cannot be justified on the basis that
this violation of international law has resulted in a humanitarian benefit to a few
individuals.
Perhaps aware that the activities of the Committee cannot be legitimated in
terms of the Convention, Professor Falk suggests that, in the absence of any
GPW revision, such a repatriation procedure must be viewed as simply
providing guidelines for similar PW returns in future conflicts. Moreover, he
asserts that the Committee's actions conclusively affirm the capacity of
nongovernmental organizations of private citizens to play a direct role in
prisoner repatriation during hostilities.
If these contentions are accepted as reasonable and desirable by the
international community, the Committee of Liaison's repatriation procedure
will prove to be of significant international law relevance. Is there any real
possibility of this occurring? Professor Levie would apparently think not. He
asserts that the future significance of the activities of the Committee conducted
in connection with the return of the U.S. flyers will be minimal. This view is
based on his belief that in an "all-out armed conflict," private repatriation by
civilians would not be practical. He foresees that these individuals would be
tried and convicted of treason or for communicating with the enemy, that
limitations would exist on wartime travel across international borders, and that
the close censorship of the news media would mitigate against any propaganda
value to be gained by the release of a token number of carefully selected PWs. 7
There would appear to be one flaw in Professor Levie's analysis of the future
significance of the Committee's activities. He has based his reasoning process on
the premise that all future conflicts will, in fact, be "all-out armed wars."
Recent history would seem to indicate otherwise. The international community
now finds itself embroiled in an age of limited warfare, internal conflicts waged
1Levie, supra note 8, at 710.
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in the name of "self-determination" and "anti-colonialism." Perhaps these are
the types of conflicts in which Professor Falk views groups such as the
Committee as playing major roles. In speaking to the future activities of such
organizations, he suggests that the humanitarian objectives of the GPW may
have to be realized in a "flexible" manner that is responsive to the
characteristics of a particular armed conflict.18 In other words, "as the present
Convention is too restrictive in its legal requirements, each party involved in
hostilities must be allowed to unilaterally determine how it will respond to
simply the 'spirit' of the Convention." He further asserts that in "particular"
armed conflicts, ". . . a private organization of nationals of the 'enemy' state
may be more acceptable to the Detaining Power in certain situations than either
the International Committee of the Red Cross or a neutral or even a friendly
third power government ... "'
In order to reaffirm the utility of the GPW and to ensure that PW
repatriations remain in the hands of governments and truly qualified
humanitarian organizations, Professor Falk's contentions must be emphatically
and totally rejected. Only then can the international community ensure that the
Committee's activities will indeed prove to be of little future significance.
Moreover, rejection of these assertions does have a logical and legal base.
The activities of the Committee of Liaison can hardly be considered as
establishing "guidelines" for PW exchanges during internal conflicts. The
possibility of such exchanges occurring during these types of hostilities is, at
best, remote. The possibility of private citizens serving as "go-betweens" for the
government and insurgents is even more so. Moreover, individuals taken into
custody during internal conflicts are not categorized as prisoners of war within
an international law context. Their treatment is exclusively dictated by the
applicable domestic legislation and Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. The "poor guerrilla" syndrome which has become so popularized
during the past several years cannot serve as a basis for obviating the effect of
this law. 90
"Falk, supra note 3, at 477.
891d.
"Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention is the only article applicable to
non-international conflicts. It reads as follows:
In the case of armed conflict not of an internationalcharacteroccurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following.acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
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It is perhaps even more important that the Committee's activities not be
interpreted as guidelines for PW repatriation during future conventional, but
limited, warfare. To do so would be to weaken the viability of the GPW, and this
is a step the international community can scarcely afford to take. This is true
not simply because the Convention is the law but because it still remains the
best and most workable means by which to ensure PW repatriation. As has been
shown, Article 109 of the Convention calls for the repatriation of prisoners
during hostilities. The "flexibility" desired by Professor Falk is provided in the
sense that parties to the conflict are free to agree to the specific terms of the
return process. Moreover, it is submitted that this agreement between the
governments involved is the key to the success of the entire repatriation
procedure. As Professor Levie has demonstrated, states have never shown an
inclination to repatriate healthy PWs while hostilities are still in progress.
However, if such exchanges are ever to occur, each party to the conflict must
have a negotiated guarantee that its interests will not be compromised, that the
return of its captured personnel will take place in accordance with
predetermined guidelines, and that it will not become a victim of carefully
orchestrated enemy propaganda. It is readily apparent that "guidelines" such
-as those proposed by the Committee while in Hanoi do not offer these
guarantees. These may be given only by governments of states negotiating
within the context of the Convention. For these reasons, no sovereign state will
look upon the manipulated activities of the Committee as establishing a rational
or legal precedent for the repatriation of captured personnel during future
conflicts. The GPW remains the best and only hope of achieving PW returns of
this kind.
It is a distinct probability that the United States is the sole country within the
international community that would allow a group of its private citizens to
engage in activities particularly detrimental to its national policies and war
efforts. Perhaps such charity on the part of the U.S. Government can be
viewed as an indication of its inherent strength and security. It is submitted,
however, that the failure of the United States to prevent all private efforts to
secure the release of American PWs was an unfortunate and costly legal, as well
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial gua rantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer
its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the Conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The applicationof the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict.
GPW, supra note 4, art. 3.
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as policy, decision, one symptomatic of a government attempting to avoid
further national divisiveness. It was a unique decision brought about by unusual
circumstances. Hopefully, with the recent passage of the War Powers Bill,91 the
conditions prompting this decision will never again be present in the United
States. Individuals engaging in activities similar to those of the Committee of
Liaison in a war supported by Congress and the American people will, as
Professor Levie asserts, undoubtedly be prosecuted under a revised and
enforceable Logan Act. 92 The same fate would most probably befall similar
individuals everywhere in the world who have proven themselves to be more
acceptable to their nation's enemy as an "impartial humanitarian organization"
than has either the ICRC or a neutral power. In matters so vital to the well-being
of nation states, it is essential that they speak and act only through their
governments.
In the final analysis, the activities of the Committee are shown to be devoid of
any form of legal precedent. They can be legitimated neither in terms of the
applicable international law nor on the basis of some final humanitarian result.
Rather than serving as guidelines for future actions of a similar nature, they are,
in fact, the result of the government's unfortunate decision to allow several
Americans to enter into a process totally unsuited for the private citizenry.

"P.L. No. 93-148. The Act provides that when the President commits U.S. troops to hostilities
abroad or "substantially" enlarges the number of U.S. troops equipped for combat in a foreign
nation, he must report to Congress within 48 hours the circumstances, authority, and scope of the
action. Moreover, he must stop the operation after 60 days unless Congress approves his action,
though it may be continued for 30 more days if the President deems it necessary to protect American
forces. Congress may order the operation halted within that period by passing a concurrent
resolution that would not be submitted to the President for possible veto.
2
As it now exists, this Act has consistently been circumvented or totally ignored as an instrument
to prosecute individuals who have interfered in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. If not
substantially revised, it must be replaced by legislation which the Department of Justice will be
willing to enforce.
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